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Abstract 
Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand, 
hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate's professional 
qualifications. On the other hand, supranational institutions often aim for broad national 
representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that 
nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we find a 
disproportionately narrow spread of national representation in the top management of the 
ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks between adjacent 
management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national 
representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 27 European 
countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for alternative sets of 
euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national macroeconomic 
data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the mid-level 
management of the ECB's core business areas best describe the central bank's interest-rate 
setting behavior. 
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I. Introduction 
In central banking, the geographical background of decision-makers and staff is often an issue 
of considerable relevance. Some central banks require that its staff members have the 
nationality of the home country. The central bank of the Philippines, for instance, requires 
that applicants for employment must be Filipino citizens.1 Other central banks have 
established monetary policy decision-making bodies in which, by law, (some) seats are 
explicitly allocated by region. In Pakistan, for instance, the central bank’s central board of 
directors comprises one director from each of the provinces.2 
 
Having no firm basis in theory, the focus on geographical representation has, in practice, both 
benefits and costs. Governments and central banks that implement such rules generally aim to 
improve decision-making and credibility, two important conditions for the success of 
monetary policy. Specifically, it is argued that regional representatives bring with them 
specific knowledge of local conditions, thereby allowing to collect and process a broader 
range of information. Also, regional representatives are able to communicate decisions to a 
wider public.3 At the same time, however, when the geographical background of an individual 
is taken explicitly into consideration, other potential criteria, most notably a candidate’s 
professional qualifications, automatically become relatively less important for appointment 
and promotion. 
 
In this paper, we examine empirically issues related to the geographical representation of 
personnel in central banks. Analyzing the composition of the management team at the 
European Central Bank (ECB), we ask whether regional features matter for employment. We 
also search for evidence of networks among staff members along regional lines. Finally, we 
                                                 
1 See http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/recruitment.asp. Citizenship is a requirement that is occasionally even 
included in the central bank law, typically for influential positions such as board members or shareholders. For 
instance, for members of the Monetary Committee, Article 16 of the Bank of Israel law stipulates that "[a] 
member from amongst the public shall be qualified for appointment if he is a resident of Israel" (see 
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pikuah/bank_hakika/eng/new_law_2010_eng.pdf). The South African 
Reserve Bank Act requires, in Article 4, that "[n]o person shall be appointed or elected as or remain a director if 
he or she is not resident in the Republic" (see 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/7DC59462E47AFDDF42256ED60038AE5C/$Fil
e/S+A+Reserve+Bank+Act.pdf). The State Bank of Pakistan Act notes that "no person shall be registered as a 
shareholder [...] who is not a citizen of Pakistan" (see http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/act/SBP-Act.pdf). 
2 See http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/act/SBP-Act.pdf. In similar fashion, the central board of directors of the 
Reserve Bank of India comprises one director from each of the four local boards (see 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RBIA1934170510.pdf). Central banks that aim for broad 
regional representation in their supervisory bodies include Danmarks Nationalbank and the Swiss National Bank. 
3 See, for instance, Goodfriend (1999) for a more detailed discussion. 
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examine whether the regional composition of central bank staff has a measurable impact on 
policy-making. 
 
The focus on the ECB has, for our purposes, a number of useful features. First, the ECB is a 
multinational institution, such that nationality is a reasonable approach to differentiate 
geographical background.4 Also, nationality is a personal characteristic that is easily 
observed, both internally and externally. Second, the ECB is a young institution. Having been 
officially established in 1998, it had to build up its staff quickly from virtually zero so that 
there are hardly persistence effects in recruiting. Third, the ECB is an institution of great 
policy relevance. The ECB is not only the largest European Union financial body, it also has 
financial and organizational autonomy.5 Given the ECB's genuine powers, governments of 
euro area member states should have a strong incentive for national representation in this 
institution.6 Fourth, in contrast to other policy areas in the European Union, monetary policy 
directly affects economic conditions in all euro area member countries, thereby providing 
another strong incentive for national representation. 
 
In our analysis, we focus particularly on national representation at the management level of 
the ECB, a choice that is motivated by a large organizational literature. For instance, Pfeffer 
(1985, p. 68) argues that "[o]rganizations are full of people. It often seems only natural and 
appropriate to analyze and manage organizations using individuals as the units of analysis." 
Thereby, we go substantially beyond previous work with a focus on national representation in 
the ECB's decision-making body, the Governing Council.7 Instead of examining de jure 
representation of countries as defined in political documents, we analyze de facto presence of 
nationals in the institution. Specifically, we estimate panel data models for staff shares of the 
27 member states of the European Union (EU) in the top management of the ECB over the 
period from 1999 through 2010. 
 
Previewing our results, we find that a nation's share of ECB managers is reasonably explained 
by country-level determinants of job applications (such as a country's distance from the ECB 
                                                 
4 Egeberg (1996) follows a similar approach. 
5 The European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund are other financial bodies of the European 
Union (see http://europa.eu/institutions/financial/index_en.htm). 
6 Scheller (2004, p. 44) notes: "As an organization created by the EC Treaty, the ECB enjoys genuine powers. 
[...] This feature distinguishes the ECB from the various decentralized agencies of the Community, which 
possess their own legal personality but have competences delegated to them by the Community institutions." 
7 Examples include, among others, Heinemann and Huefner (2004) and Belke and von Schnurbein (2012). 
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headquarter) rather than broad geographical representation. This finding seems to indicate that 
hiring decisions are generally made on the basis of a candidate's professional qualifications. 
Still, national background also seems to matter for recruitment. There is evidence that strong 
national representation at a particular management level is typically associated with similarly 
strong national presence at the subordinate management layer. Finally, based on Taylor rule 
estimates to describe the ECB's interest-rate setting behavior, we find that monetary policy 
decisions are most closely linked to national representation in the core business areas of the 
ECB. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature. 
Section III provides some institutional background on the European Central Bank, followed 
by a description of the data in section IV. The heart of the paper is section V which presents 
our empirical model and the estimation results. Section VI briefly summarizes our findings. 
 
II. Related Literature 
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. There has been extensive work, for 
instance, on regional representation in a central bank's main decision-making body, the 
monetary policy committee. Specifically, a number of studies have examined to what extent 
the presence of regional representatives in the board has affected monetary policy decisions. 
Reviewing the voting records of individual board members, there seems to be consistent 
evidence that regional economic conditions help explain dissent voting of regional 
representatives. Berger and De Haan (2002), for example, argue that economic differences 
across German states translated into differences in voting behavior in the Bundesbank's 
Governing Council (Zentralbankrat) in which all German state central banks held voting 
rights. Similarly, Gildea (1992), Meade and Sheets (2005), and Chappell Jr., McGregor and 
Vermilyea (2008), among others, find that members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
in the US are influenced in voting by economic conditions in the regions that they represent. 
None of these papers has considered regional representation at the staff level. 
 
A sizable body of work is concerned with the design of central bank committees more 
generally. With reference to regional representation, Berger, Nitsch, and Lybek (2008) find 
that politically fragmented countries typically have larger monetary policy committees. 
Berger and Nitsch (2011) show that central banks with required regional representation tend 
to achieve, on average, lower inflation. 
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Another relevant strand of the literature focuses on the effects of individuals in organizations. 
In an interesting study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that corporate managers measurably 
affect firm behavior and economic performance. Moreover, they identify differences in 
"styles" across managers which can then be linked to observable managerial characteristics. 
For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) note that executives from earlier birth cohorts seem 
to be on average more conservative, while managers with an MBA degree tend to follow 
more aggressive strategies. For central banks, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) find that board 
members who were previously member of the central bank staff prefer significantly lower 
inflation rates than former politicians do. In similar fashion, Dreher, Lamla, Lein, and 
Somogyi (2009) argue that heads of government who are former entrepreneurs are more 
likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms; Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) 
find that more educated political leaders generate higher economic growth. While we are 
generally sympathetic with the finding that individuals have an effect on organizational 
outcomes, we deviate from this literature in various respects. For one thing, our focus is 
exclusively on the regional background of individuals instead of their educational and 
professional qualifications.8 More importantly, we examine a much broader group of 
individuals. Instead of examining the role of leaders, we cover in our analysis the (various) 
top management levels of an organization. 
 
In this respect, our approach is also related to an interesting literature, mainly in management 
science, on the demographic structure of organizations. This literature refrains from the 
analysis of individual features and emphasizes, in contrast, the compositional aspects of 
organizations. Pfeffer (1985, p. 79) argues, for instance, that "[t]he difficulty with this 
[individualistic] approach is its neglect of the interdependence and relationships that are the 
essential, indeed defining, characteristic of organizations." 
 
III. The ECB 
The process of European integration is characterized by a delegation of functions, in a 
growing number of policy areas, from the national level to the European Union. In many 
instances this has led to the establishment of new multi- and supranational institutions.9 The 
                                                 
8 While it would be interesting to also analyze personal characteristics of managers other than nationality, 
relevant data for such a large and diverse group of people is almost impossible to obtain. 
9 As a result, there are, in the meantime, many EU institutions, agencies, bodies, commissions and committees. 
An early example is the EURATOM Supply Agency, founded in 1960 and headquartered in Luxembourg, which 
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European Central Bank is a particularly important case in point. When the decision was taken 
to complete the Single Market with a single currency, responsibilities for monetary policy 
needed to be centralized. As a result, the ECB was created, which forms, along with the 
national central banks of the euro area member countries, the monetary policy-making 
authority in the euro area, the Eurosystem.10 
 
The official agreements about the establishment of the ECB date back to the Treaty on 
European Union ('Maastricht Treaty'), which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. 
The Treaty defined the monetary policy framework in the economic and monetary union; it 
also contained the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB 
which was attached as a Protocol to the Treaty.11  
 
For the immediate preparatory work, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established 
as a transitory body on 1 January 1994.12 The objective of the EMI was, among other things, 
to specify the regulatory, organizational and logistical framework necessary for the ESCB to 
perform its tasks. Based on the EMI's conceptual design, the ECB was finally established on 
1 June 1998, while the EMI went into liquidation. Seven months later, on 1 January 1999, 
eleven EU member states adopted the euro as their common currency, and the ECB took over 
responsibility for conducting the single monetary policy in the euro area. 
 
As liquidator of the EMI, the ECB inherited the EMI infrastructure. Scheller (2004, p. 25) 
argues that the infrastructure included "a body of staff which had been prepared to undertake 
its duties at the ECB". Most of the EMI staff, however, were on fixed-term contracts, so that 
the ECB faced effectively no restrictions from the past in setting up management and staffing 
                                                                                                                                                        
is responsible for the regular and equitable supply of nuclear fuels for Community users. A very recent example, 
in contrast, is the European Banking Authority, established on 1 January 2011 and headquartered in London, 
which is a regulatory agency for the financial sector. See http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm for an 
overview. 
10 Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009, p. 495) note: "Each member [country] still comes equipped with its own central 
bank, the last remaining vestige of lost monetary sovereignty. No matter how daring the founding fathers of the 
EMU were, they stopped short of merging the national central banks into a single institution, partly for fear of 
having to dismiss thousands of employees." 
11 Article 105(2) of the Treaty notes: "The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: to define and 
implement the monetary policy of the Community[...]." Article 106 notes:  "(1) The ESCB shall be composed of 
the ECB and of the national central banks. (2) The ECB shall have legal personality." See 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf. 
12 The EMI replaced the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the member states, as specified in 
Article 109f(1) of the Treaty. Operationally, the EMI started with the 28 staff members of the secretariat of the 
Committee of Governors in Basle. 
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structures.13 More importantly, staff size of the ECB has quadrupled after establishment, 
rising from a permanent staff of 407 on 31 May 1998 to a full-time equivalent number of 
1607 at the end of 2010. Over the same period, the number of managerial positions has 
increased by more than factor three, rising from 45 to 156. In sum, the ECB can be plausibly 
described as an institution, which had to build up its staff from virtually zero after creation. 
 
For the employment decisions of the ECB, there are no political, administrative or other 
external constraints. Partly reflecting the institution's independence, Article 36.1 of the Statute 
of the ESCB and the ECB stipulates that "[t]he Governing Council [of the ECB], on a 
proposal from the Executive Board, shall lay down the conditions of employment of the staff 
of the ECB". The conditions were then fixed in the Rules of Procedure at the ECB, adopted 
by the Governing Council, and turn out to be very general principles. Article 20.2 of the Rules 
states that "[m]embers of staff shall be selected, appointed and promoted with due regard to 
the principles of professional qualification, publicity, transparency, equal access and non-
discrimination." 14 
 
The selection process was further specified in Administrative Circular 5/2004 which contains 
detailed rules for recruitment. Apart from the general rule that the ECB appoints only 
nationals of European Union member states, which seems to be in line with the Staff 
Regulations of officials of the European Communities15, this document lays down additional 
rules on nationality. Specifically, recruitment at the ECB is directed at the broadest possible 
geographical representation, without imposing a specific national quota. Article 5.4 of the 
Circular explicitly states: "In the event that candidates have equal qualifications for a position, 
gender and/or nationality may be used as additional criteria for the selection decision with a 
view to achieving a balanced representation of gender and/or nationalities."16 In the following, 
we examine national representation at the ECB at various levels of hierarchy in more detail. 
                                                 
13 The Annual Report of the EMI for 1994 states (p. 66): "Members of staff have generally been appointed on 
three-year fixed-term contracts."; see http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar1994en.pdf. The view of no 
contractual restrictions is confirmed in the Annual Report of the ECB for 1998, noting (p. 145): "Most EMI staff 
contracts were due to expire at the end of 1998. By the date on which these statements were drawn up, 322 
permanent staff had transferred to the ECB under new contracts."; see 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar1998en.pdf. 
14 See http:// www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_33819981215en00280033.pdf. 
15 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/1962/R/01962R0031-20060701-en.pdf. 
16 Article 5.2 notes: "Without prejudice to the principle stated above, the selection process shall also be directed 
to securing the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the European 
Union. No nationality quota shall apply and no vacancy shall be reserved for a specific nationality." See 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/pdf/recruitmentrules.pdf. 
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IV. Data 
At the heart of our paper is a newly compiled panel data set on the nationality of top managers 
at the European Central Bank. In contrast to previous studies which often focus on a central 
bank's monetary policy committee, we cover all management layers of the ECB, including the 
heads of directorates, divisions and sections. Our data set is based on the organizational charts 
of the ECB. The ECB regularly publishes charts of its organizational structure along with the 
names (but not the nationalities) of the responsible managers, in the most current version, on 
its website. We have compiled the charts for the period from 1999 to 2010; the data is on an 
annual basis and refers to the organizational structure at the beginning of each year.17 
 
In total, the ECB has appointed, since its establishment, 210 individuals on managerial 
positions (including deputies). For each individual, we aim to identify the nationality. To do 
so, we use a variety of sources, including internet search, newswire reports and personal 
communication. Overall, we were able to confirm the nationality of 190 individuals, except 
for a few managers of mainly technical and administrative divisions. In our analysis, we deal 
with those missings in three ways. As our baseline approach, we impose nationality based on 
the name of the individual. This procedure is relatively straightforward and simple; it also 
allows us to analyze the full sample. Alternatively, we drop individuals without proper 
information on nationality. Finally, we focus our analysis on the divisions of key importance 
for the operations of the ECB (core business areas), thereby reducing the number of 
individuals with missing nationality. 
 
The top decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing Council, which comprises the 
Presidents/Governors of the national central banks of the member countries of the euro area 
and the 6-member Executive Board. Given the politically-determined composition of this 
body (with members being appointed at the level of heads of state or government), our focus 
is on the remaining levels of management. The ECB's organizational structure below the 
Governing Council initially consisted of two management levels; i) the directorates general or 
directorates, and ii) divisions. After a period of strong growth of the institution, sections were 
introduced as third management level in 2003. Table 1 describes the evolution of the number 
of (filled) management positions at the ECB over time. In addition, there is, for each position, 
the option of establishing a deputy head. In our empirical analysis, we experiment with both 
                                                 
17 We are indebted to the ECB's Press Division for the kind provision of missing information. 
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groups of managers, heads only and heads and deputies combined. Fortunately, our results 
turn out to be generally consistent across samples. 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
Our central bank data is augmented with data from a number of standard sources, including 
the IMF's International Financial Statistics, the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
and OECD statistics. A detailed list of variables and sources is provided in an appendix. Our 
sample covers the 27 member countries of the European Union. Since 12 of these countries 
have entered the European Union during the sample period, the panel is unbalanced. We only 
include countries which, as members of the EU, have subscribed to the capital of the ECB.18 
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Who Gets Appointed? 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining patterns of national representation in the 
management of the ECB. Specifically, we aim to identify to what extent the ECB's aim of 
"broadest possible geographical representation" indeed matters for recruitment. Our empirical 
approach is straight forward. To quantify potential country biases in the ECB's hiring policy, 
we examine the extent to which the national distribution of management positions is 
described by the following two (benchmark) principles:  
i) Equal representation (ܧ), or representation with parity, which implies that each member 
state holds the same percentage of the ECB's top management staff such that ௜ܵ,௧ா ൌ
ܵ௧ா ൌ 1/ ௧ܰ , where ݅ is the country index and ௧ܰ is the number of EU member states in 
year ݐ.19 
 
ii) Proportional representation (ܲ), which implies that the staff share of each member state 
corresponds to the country's share in the ECB's capital (and, thus, reflects its relative 
demographic and economic size), which we refer to as ௜ܵ,௧௉ .20 
                                                 
18 In practice, the ECB has started recruiting from accession countries more than a year before entry into the 
European Union (that is, immediately after the treaty of accession to the EU was signed). For our analysis, 
however, this difference is without relevance. 
19 Since citizens of all EU member states are eligible for employment with the ECB (see 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/apply/html/index.en.html), we use the number of EU countries rather than the 
number of euro area countries, but we control for euro area membership later on. 
20 Capital shares are determined (and regularly recalculated) based on a country's total population and GDP (in 
equal weightings). The shares currently range from 18.94% for Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) to 0.06% for 
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If candidates are mainly selected according to their professional qualifications, we would 
expect that the share of top positions filled by nationals of a member state is largely 
determined by the available supply of qualified candidates. More explicitly, the probability of 
a perfect fit of an applicant's personal profile with the requirements of an open position is 
higher for nationalities with a large pool of applicants. As a result, since the ECB is likely to 
receive a larger number of applications from individuals of more populous countries, these 
countries should be disproportionately strongly represented in the ECB. By assumption, our 
default distribution of candidates is given by the capital subscription key of the ECB. In fact, 
to the extent that the qualification profiles of applicants are equally distributed across EU 
member states (a strong assumption that will be relaxed below), national staff shares in the 
ECB should fit perfectly with the national capital share. 
 
Broad representation of nationalities, in contrast, would imply that the selection decision for 
hiring or promotion is largely based on an individual's national background. Consequently, 
qualifications become less relevant for appointment, biasing the distribution towards countries 
with few(er) representatives. In the extreme, each country has the same share of 
representatives in the management of the ECB. 
 
We start our investigation by using a highly parsimonious model specification which includes 
only our two benchmark distributions; that is, we estimate regressions of the form: 
 
ܴ௜,௧ℓ ൌ ߟாܵ௧ா ൅ ߟ௉ ௜ܵ,௧௉ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ , (1) 
 
where ܴ௜,௧ℓ  is country i's share of representatives at management level ℓ in year ݐ, ௜ܵ,௧ா  and ௜ܵ,௧௉  
are the equal and proportional representation staff shares (as defined above), and	ߝ௜,௧ is a 
country-specific error term. The main advantage of this reduced-form regression specification 
is that it allows to identify directly the weight of the two principles of national representation 
in the management of the ECB. As ܵ௧ா and ௜ܵ,௧௉  sum to one over all countries ݅, the estimates of 
ߟா and ߟ௉ are, by least squares algebra, also required to sum to one.21, 22  
                                                                                                                                                        
Malta (Central Bank of Malta); see http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html. In practice, our 
measure of proportional representation based on capital shares corresponds very closely to an alternative 
formulation of the measure based exclusively on the economic weight of countries. 
21 Note that ௧ܰ തܴ௜,௧ℓ ൌ ௧ܰܵ௜̅,௧௉ ൌ 1, where the bar denotes cross-section averages, while ܵ௧ா is a time-specific 
(rescaled) constant. Since ܵ௧ா ൌ 1/ ௧ܰ, it holds for all t (and, therefore, also for the pooled model) that ̂ߟா ൌ
௧ܰ൫ തܴ௜,௧ℓ െ ̂ߟ௉ܵ௜̅,௧௉ ൯ ൌ 1 െ ̂ߟ௉. 
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In our empirical implementation, we estimate equation (1) separately for individual 
management levels ℓ, using an (unbalanced) panel of 27 EU member states over the period 
from 1999 to 2010 (with a total of 248 observations23). Moreover, to ensure the robustness of 
our results, we analyze national staff shares at various levels of aggregation. For instance, in 
addition to individual management layers, we consider the overall share of countries in the 
management of the ECB as well as a weighted average of managers across all management 
levels.24 In another exercise, we restrict our analysis to the share of representatives in the 
ECB's (self-defined) core business areas. These functional units are of particular interest and 
relevance as they are directly involved in the formulation and implementation of the ECB's 
monetary policy.25 
 
 
< Table 2 here > 
 
Table 2 presents the results. The table contains three panels. The upper panel reports estimates 
for our baseline measure of national representation in the management of the ECB (based on 
the nationality of the heads of all the respective units); the remaining two panels tabulate 
analogous results for alternative representation measures. Across columns, the regressand 
varies along another dimension, the management level. Specifically, we start our investigation 
by examining country shares for heads of directorates, divisions and sections (columns 1-3), 
followed by an exploration of aggregate measures as described  (columns 4-5). In total, the 
table reports (paired) coefficient estimates of ߟா and ߟ௉ for 15 different measures of country 
representation in the ECB. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 An alternative approach to examine the role of nationality in employment is to test for the (joint) significance 
of country dummies, holding constant for variables which can reasonably be expected to affect representation 
without disrespecting the treaties (such as economic size or education). The main drawback of this approach is 
that the country dummies also capture the effects of time-invariant labor market characteristics (such as, for 
instance, a country's distance to Frankfurt). 
23 For sections, which were introduced in 2004, sample size reduces to 173 observations. 
24 We assign a weight of 1 for directorates, 0.5 for divisions and 0.25 for sections. Since sections were first 
introduced in 2004, weighted aggregates for the period before are calculated based on directorates and divisions 
only to avoid losing observations. 
25 The ECB has defined as its core business areas: Banknotes; Economics; Financial Stability; International and 
European Relations; Legal Services; Market Operations; Payments and Market Infrastructure; Research; 
Statistics; the Target2-Securities Program; and the ECB Permanent Representation in Washington, DC. 
Supporting business areas are: Counsel to the Executive Board; Administration; Communications; Human 
Resources, Budget and Organization; Information Systems; Internal Audit and Secretariat and Language 
Services. See http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_005.en.html. 
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Reviewing the results, two observations are particularly noteworthy. First, the estimated 
coefficients on the capital share sizably and consistently exceed the corresponding estimates 
on the parity benchmark. While the point estimates of ߟ௉ are always statistically highly 
significant and take values close to one, the ߟா estimates are typically much smaller in 
magnitude and often statistically indifferent from zero at conventional levels of significance. 
These findings indicate that the geographical patterns of top-level staff employment at the 
ECB rarely deviate from proportional representation; the majority of positions are filled with 
nationals from countries with the largest contributions to the ECB's capital. Provided that our 
(working) assumption is correct that the supply of (qualified) applicants is roughly in 
proportion to the size of a country, professional qualifications clearly seem to dominate the 
national background in hiring. 
 
Second, the estimates of ߟா turn out to be positive, economically relevant and statistically 
significant (with a t-statistic of around 3) for the highest level of management and 
responsibility in the organizational structure of the ECB, the heads of directorates and 
directorates general. The weight assigned to ܵா , the equal representation share of countries, is 
about 0.2 for these top positions; the top (directorate) level also appears to measurably affect 
the results for our aggregate measures of national representation. A plausible explanation for 
this finding is that the director position is highly competitive, allowing to recruit qualified 
candidates from a broad range of countries.26  
 
Our reduced-form regressions implicitly assume that a constant fraction of a country's 
population is seeking employment at the ECB; a national staff share close to the country's 
capital share is interpreted as evidence of proportional representation. In practice, however, 
the supply of qualified candidates is unlikely to be uniformly distributed across EU member 
states. For instance, employment at the ECB may be particularly attractive for individuals 
from economically well-educated and geographically close countries. Therefore, to deal with 
this issue, we augment equation (1) by adding a host of other factors that might affect a 
country's supply of labor (suitably trained for employment at the ECB):  
 
ܴ௜,௧ℓ ൌ ߟாܵ௧ா ൅ ߟ௉ ௜ܵ,௧௉ ൅ ܠ௜,௧ࢼ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. (2) 
 
                                                 
26 For the Governing Council and the Executive Board, the point estimates of ߟ௉ are 0.71 and 0.30, respectively. 
As argued above, however, the estimation results for these politically-determined executive management layers 
should be interpreted with caution. 
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In particular, we employ the following set of (time-variant) country-specific control variables 
(ܠ௜,௧): a binary dummy variable which takes the value of one if country ݅ is a member of the 
euro area at time ݐ (and zero otherwise); the length of ݅'s membership in the euro area in 
years; the log of distance between the national capital of ݅ and Frankfurt (Germany), the 
location of the headquarter of the ECB; a dummy variable which takes the value of one if ݅ 
has a common land border with Germany (and zero otherwise); the share of the population 
with upper and tertiary education; the number of staff of the national central bank relative to 
population size; and the share of the population speaking the German language. Moreover, in 
order to ensure comparability with the results from our baseline specification, we impose the 
restriction that ߟா ൌ ሺ1 െ ߟ௉ሻ, without loss of generality.27 
 
Table 3 presents the results. As before, the columns tabulate coefficient estimates for 
individual management levels and aggregate representation shares. In addition, we provide, 
for completeness, results for national representation in the Governing Council of the ECB. 
 
The key parameter of interest to us is (again) ߟா, the estimated parameter on the benchmark 
share of equal representation. As shown, the point estimates of ߟா generally increase in both 
magnitude and significance, after controlling for a broad(er) range of factors potentially 
affecting the national number of applicants. Although the weight assigned to ܵா  is still 
relatively moderate, there is clear evidence that the ECB's appointment decisions tend to bias 
the national staff shares towards a "broad geographical representation", once we take 
(properly) into account that the pool of candidates for employment at the ECB varies across 
countries. Further, it is interesting to note that this pattern holds particularly for the upper 
layers of management, confirming our earlier findings.28 
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
While the control variables are not of direct interest, the results turn out to be reasonable and 
significant. For instance, the availability of qualified personnel seems to matter for 
representation beyond a country's capital share: Countries with a larger (relative) staff size of 
the national central bank generally have more representatives in the management of the ECB. 
                                                 
27 Under the null hypothesis that ߟா ൌ 0, the restriction implies a simple rescaling of ߟ௉ to which least squares 
estimation is invariant. 
28 Without taking the precise results too literally, it seems reassuring that the largest estimates of ߟா are obtained 
for the composition of the Governing Council and the Executive Board. 
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Also, it seems easier to find and attract promising candidates for the filling of positions if they 
are already close to Frankfurt. In contrast, only for top management positions at the ECB, 
membership in the euro area is significantly (positively) associated with national 
representation, possibly reflecting the ECB's aspiration to document its EU-wide recruitment 
strategy in the organizational chart; this approach seems to be most easily possible and 
justifiable for less influential management positions. There are similarly mixed results for 
other country features, such as familiarity with the German language. Overall, the regressions 
fit the data well; more than three-fourths of the variation in national representation is 
explained by our model. 
 
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
As before, we have performed extensive robustness checks. To economize on space, Table 4 
presents a subset of the results of those exercises, tabulating estimates for the specification 
with the total number of representatives only. We modify our sample along various 
dimensions. In the first column, we examine a sample when individuals for which we have no 
confirmed information on nationality are dropped. Our baseline results remain basically 
unchanged for this perturbation. Next, we examine pooled information on the department 
heads and their deputies, again producing essentially similar results. In another exercise, we 
restrict our analysis on managers in the ECB's core business areas. Interestingly, for the core 
areas, membership in the euro area seems to become an important precondition for 
appointment. In contrast, knowledge of the German language becomes less relevant than for 
the sample of all organizational units. A plausible explanation may be that it is especially in 
supporting business areas (such as infrastructure), where interactions with local businesses 
(and, thus, the ability to properly communicate with locals) are particularly important. Again, 
none of our results are changed when we additionally take ECB managers with deputy 
function into consideration. Finally, our baseline results are basically confirmed when 
Germany is dropped from the sample, though the results for the German language and 
neighboring countries appear to be somewhat driven by German nationals in the ECB. 
 
5.2 Does Presence in Top Management Matter for Appointment? 
In a next step, we explore the possible existence of national networks in the ECB. 
Specifically, we analyze whether national presence at top management levels also affects 
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national representation at lower management levels. It could be argued, for instance, that, 
after a change in the ECB's top management, nationals of other countries are targeted for 
lower-level positions in order to achieve broad geographical representation within a given 
business area; that is, there should be a gradual replacement at lower management levels (to 
the extent individual contracts allow for such behavior29). Alternatively, nationals at the top 
level may act as a door-opener for fellow nationals. Specifically, given that in the day-to-day 
business, personal interaction is often crucially important, there may be a tendency to select 
subordinates that share the same language and culture. 
 
To analyze these issues empirically, we (further) augment our baseline regression framework 
by measures of national presence in higher management levels. That is, we estimate variants 
of the following augmented version of equation (2): 
 
ܴ௜,௧ℓ ൌ ߢ௉ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߢ௏௉ܸ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߢா஻ܧܤ௜,௧ ൅ ߢℓᇲܴ௜,௧ℓᇲ ൅ ߟாܵ௧ா ൅ ߟ௉ ௜ܵ,௧௉ ൅ ܠ௜,௧ࢼ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. (3) 
  
where ܲ is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of one if the President of the ECB is 
from country i (and zero otherwise), ܸܲ and ܧܤ are analogous variables for the Vice 
President of the ECB and other Executive Board members, respectively, and ܴ௜,௧ℓᇲ  is the share 
of national representation at management level ℓᇱ superior to the management level of the 
regressand ℓ. (For sections, these are the directorates and divisions; for divisions, these are 
directorates only.) Overall, we consider this a very demanding specification since we already 
control for patterns of country representation at the management level. 
 
Estimation results for equation (3) are presented in Table 5. While all regressions include our 
benchmark distribution shares and the full set of controls ܠ, only the estimates of the ߢ's are 
tabulated for the sake of brevity. In addition, we note that none of our previous estimates of 
ߟா and ߟ௉ is sizably affected by adding information on superior management levels. 
 
As before, we proceed sequentially, beginning with the most senior management level 
(directorates) on the left of the table. The results in the first column indicate that individuals 
who share the nationality of the president are indeed more likely to be appointed as head of 
directorate/directorate general, holding constant other country-specific determinants for 
                                                 
29 Changes in the responsibilities of senior managers in the ECB are indeed "in accordance with its policy to 
promote mobility within the ECB, which is aimed at strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organization"; see http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2006/html/pr060803_2.en.html. 
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representation in the top management of the ECB. As noted before, however, this observation 
may be not particularly surprising, given that there are some sensitive positions (such as head 
of communications) where cultural differences between individuals should be avoided. There 
is no measurable effect, in contrast, for other members of the Executive Board, including the 
Vice President.  
 
< Table 5 here > 
 
The next column presents analogous results for the second management level, heads of 
divisions. The results are virtually identical, except for the effect of Vice Presidency. The 
(negative) coefficient implies that fellow nationals face a disproportionately low probability 
of appointment at this level. When we extend our analysis to also include the share of 
representatives at the level of directorates (column 3), the coefficient on this variable takes a 
positive value but is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
There is more weak evidence on national network effects between adjacent 
management layers at the lowest ECB management level, sections. The results for alternative 
regression specifications are tabulated in the last four columns on the right of Table 5. While 
the estimation results for the various levels of senior management are mixed, with a slight 
overrepresentation of the home country of the President among section heads and a 
disproportionately low presence of the nationality of the Vice President and other Executive 
Board members, the national presence at the division level (i.e., the direct supervisor) has a 
measurable positive effect on representation at the section level. Overall, our findings suggest 
that there is a positive association between national representation shares at adjacent 
management levels, indicating the existence of national network effects.  
 
5.3 Monetary Policy Effects of National Representation 
 
5.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
Finally, we ask: Does national representation in the ECB affect monetary policy decision-
making? Previous studies have strongly focused on the national distribution of votes in the 
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ECB decision-making body, the Governing Council.30 We examine the association between 
national representation in the ECB's top management and monetary policy decision-making. 
 
To analyze this issue, we estimate Taylor-type interest rate rules which specify the nominal 
interest rate as a function of inflation and the output gap; Taylor rules are typically found to 
describe actual monetary policy reasonably well. For the ECB, whose monetary policy is 
targeted at the euro area, the variables of interest for policy-making are country-size weighted 
averages of national data from euro area member countries. Consequently, we would expect 
that a Taylor rule specification for euro area aggregates of inflation and output based on the 
economic weight of member countries best describes the ECB's monetary policy behavior. 
Possible effects of national representation on policy-making are then identified by 
investigating the empirical fit of Taylor rules based on alternative weighting schemes for 
national data, using a country's staff share in the ECB rather than its economic weight to 
compute euro area aggregates. Since a comparison of the fit of different models does not 
allow rigorous statistical inference with respect to superiority of one model, we consider the 
results mainly as indicative.31 
 
5.3.2 Model Specification and Data  
Our baseline specification follows English, Nelson and Sack (2003), who use a Taylor rule 
specification that allows for both partial adjustment of the actual to the target interest rate and 
for serial correlation in the error term. These two features are considered as relevant in 
explaining deviations of the actual interest rate from the rate implied by a standard (static) 
Taylor rule.32 
 
The full model is made up of three equations. Consider a forward-looking Taylor rule in 
which the target interest rate ݅௧∗ is described as a function of the deviation of future expected 
                                                 
30 For instance, Berger and Mueller (2007) argue that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member  
countries in the ECB Council might be extreme. Hayo and Méon (2011) examine empirically the effect of the 
national composition of the Governing Council on decision-making. 
31 There are also other reasons for a cautious interpretation of the results. Taylor rules focus on only one aspect 
of monetary policy, the key interest rate, thereby ignoring other policy measures taken by central banks; these 
measures (such as the outright monetary transactions program of the ECB) have recently gained in importance 
for policy-making. Another potential concern is that Taylor rules, while providing an empirically reasonable (ex 
post) description of monetary policy, often do not turn out as optimal prescriptive rule for monetary policy in 
theoretical models. 
32 For recent applications of this approach, see Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2008) and Sturm and de Haan 
(2011). 
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inflation ߨ௧௘  from its target ߨത௧ and the change in the output gap, i.e., the deviation of expected 
output growth Δlnݕ௧௘ from (expected) growth of potential output Δlnݕത௧:33 
 
݅௧∗ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨ௧௘ 	െ ߨത௧ ሻ ൅ ߛሺΔlnݕ௧௘ െΔlnݕത௧ሻ, (4) 
 
so that   denotes the neutral nominal interest rate, i.e., the interest rate, when inflation is at 
its target and output growth is equal to trend growth. 
 
In practice, it seems reasonable to assume that the actual interest rate ݅ is adjusted only 
gradually to its target level so that: 
 
݅௧ 		ൌ ߩ݅௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻ݅௧∗ ൅ ϑ௧ (5) 
 
where ሺ1 െ ߩሻ is the speed of adjustment parameter. Finally, the error term is allowed to 
exhibit first order serial correlation: 
 
ϑ௧ ൌ ߜϑ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ (6) 
 
Using then a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation and rewriting the equation in first differences, 
we obtain (see English, Nelson, and Sack, 2003): 
 
Δ݅௧ 		ൌ ߩΔ݅௧∗ ൅ ߩሺ1 െ ߜሻሺ݅௧ିଵ∗ െ ݅௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߩߜΔ݅௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ (7) 
 
which is our benchmark empirical model. 
 
In our empirical implementation, we use the ECB's main refinancing rate as dependent 
variable. The main refinancing rate is the key interest rate, set by the Governing Council, and 
assumed to reflect directly the ECB's monetary policy setting behavior. In extensive 
robustness checks, we also experiment with market-based interest rates, such as the 3-month 
Euribor and Eonia. 
 
                                                 
33 In the empirical literature, it has become standard practice to use the change in the output gap rather than its 
level. Walsh (2003) advocates the use of such a modified Taylor rule in the presence of uncertainty about the 
output gap; see also Orphanides (2003). For a discussion of the advantages of using growth rates rather than 
levels, see Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008, p. 4). 
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We estimate our model using monthly data for the period from January 1999 to June 2008. 34 
Data on expected inflation and output growth are obtained from Consensus Economics. 
Following the literature, we use the professional forecasts of inflation and output growth in 
the current and the following year to construct monthly measures of real-time expectations for 
the key macroeconomic variables.35 The series for the euro area are then obtained as weighted 
averages of the country values, i.e., 
 
ߨ௧,௠௘ 			ൌ ∑ ߱௜,௧ߨ௜,௧,௠௘ே೟௜ୀଵ  and ݕ௧,௠௘ 			ൌ ∑ ߱௜,௧Δݕ௜,௧,௠௘ே೟௜ୀଵ  
 
(8) 
  
where, in our benchmark specification, the weight ߱௜,௧ is country i's share in the real GDP of 
the euro area in year ݐ and ௧ܰ is the (time-variant) number of euro area member countries. 36 
Finally, in order to quantify macroeconomic conditions as deviation from medium-term 
targets, we set target inflation to 2%, based on the ECB's definition of price stability, and 
assume potential output growth of 2.25%, using the mid-point of the interval given by the 
ECB. 
 
5.3.3 Estimation Results 
Table 6 presents estimation results for various specifications of the Taylor rule. We proceed 
stepwise. In the first three columns of the table, we tabulate results when a country's real GDP 
is used as weight ߱௜,௧ to aggregate national data.37 Across these columns, we vary both the 
regression specification and the estimation technique, without much effect. The remaining 
seven columns report analogues, for our preferred specification, when national representation 
shares at ECB management levels (instead of economic size) are used as weights. Our 
measure of interest is the goodness of fit of the Taylor rule specification; we use the ܴଶ, 
                                                 
34 Extending the sample to also include more recent months would bias the Taylor rule estimate towards the 
output gap at the expense of the inflation rate (which becomes insignificant). This result is not too surprising, 
given that the ECB interest rates have been at record lows during times of financial crisis.  
35 More specifically, we compute the weighted average of the Consensus forecasts for the current year (ܿ) and 
the following year (݂). Expected inflation for country ݅ in year ݐ, month ݉ is then given by ߨ௜,௧,௠௘ ൌଵଷି௠
ଵଶ ߨ௜,௧,௠௖ ൅
௠ିଵ
ଵଶ ߨ௜,௧,௠
௙ , where ߨ௜,௧,௠௖  and ߨ௜,௧,௠௙  denote Consensus forecasts for country ݅ in year ݐ, month ݉ for 
the rate of inflation (in percent) in the current and following year, respectively. An analogous procedure is used 
to compute expected output growth, where ሾଵଷି௠ଵଶ Δlnݕ௜,௧,௠௖ ൅
௠ିଵ
ଵଶ Δlnݕ௜,௧,௠
௙ ]100, with Δlnݕ௜,௧,௠௖  and 
Δlnݕ௜,௧,௠௙  denoting Consensus forecasts for GDP growth (in percent) in the current and the following year, 
respectively; see also Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2008). 
36 All shares are defined with respect to the current size of euro area at time ݐ (that is, the shares always sum to 
one). Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg are dropped from our sample, because survey data from Consensus 
Economics is not available. 
37 Results turn out to be virtually identical when a country's capital subscription key in the ECB is used as 
weight; the results are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
 19
which corresponds to the squared correlation between the predicted values from the empirical 
model and the actual main refinancing rate. 
 
The first column reports parameter estimates for the full model with no restrictions. As 
shown, the AR parameter	ߜ is insignificant in our sample, which may be explained by the 
smooth time series properties of the main refinancing rate. In the next (and the following) 
column(s), therefore, we tabulate results for a specification when ߜ ൌ 0. For this 
modification, the parameter estimates slightly decrease in magnitude, but the overall results 
remain essentially unchanged. Most notably, the point estimates of the parameters for 
expected inflation and the expected change in the output gap turn out to be virtually identical. 
The estimates imply that an increase in expected inflation (the expected change in the output 
gap) by 1 percentage point induces an increase in the ECB's main refinancing rate by 1.9 
percent (that is, the expected real interest rate increases after an upsurge in inflation 
expectations).38 Also, interest rates display a high degree of persistence; the point estimate of 
 indicates that about 10 percent of the difference between the actual rate and the target rate is 
closed each month. Finally, in light of the fact that the model is specified in first differences, 
the empirical fit of the regression is satisfactory, with an ܴଶ of 0.231. For comparison, the 
implied squared correlation between the actual and predicted values of the level of the interest 
rate amounts to 0.857. 
 
Next, to address potential endogeneity concerns, we re-estimate the model by two stages least 
squares (2SLS), using the first and second time lag of the explanatory variables as 
instruments. For this estimation technique, the point estimates of the response parameters are 
virtually unchanged; moreover, a Hausman-type test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
least squares estimates and the 2SLS estimates are identical. Overall, we consider the 
(restricted) model in the second column of Table 6 as our preferred specification of the Taylor 
rule.  
 
In the following, we apply this specification to estimate Taylor rules based on alternative 
weighting schemes for national data to compute euro area aggregrates of the inflation gap and 
the output gap. As argued above, if monetary policy is directed more strongly towards the 
macroeconomic conditions in countries that are well represented in the ECB management, we 
                                                 
38 The finding of symmetric weighting of inflation and economic growth in the ECB's monetary policy is a 
remarkable result, although not new to the literature. Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008, p. 13) conclude that "the 
ECB takes movements in real variables at least as serious as movements in inflation". 
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would expect that Taylor rule specifications that use national representation as weights to 
aggregate national data provide a superior empirical fit than our default specification based on 
economic weights. Our benchmark value for the ܴଶ (correlation) is 0.231 (0.481). 
 
We begin, mainly for completeness, with the results for national representation in the 
Governing Council and its two subgroups, the Executive Board and the group of the 
Governors of national central banks (with each Governor having a single vote in the Council). 
Reassuringly, given that Council members are expected to make decisions exclusively based 
on information for the euro area aggregate, national representation in the Council has no 
measurable effect on the appropriateness of ECB monetary policy for individual countries as 
measured by the empirical fit of the Taylor rule; the ܴଶ decreases from 0.23 to about 0.20. 
 
< Table 6 here > 
 
We then turn to the two top management layers of the ECB, directorates/directorates general 
and divisions.39 As shown in column 7, the point estimates of the coefficients slightly differ 
from the regression based on economic weights; the estimated  coefficient on the inflation 
gap even becomes insignificant, which casts some doubt on this specification. Moreover, the 
ܴଶ falls notably to 0.184 when national representation at the directorates level of the ECB is 
used to aggregate national macroeconomic data. While the findings for divisions display a 
much better empirical fit, the ܴଶ of 0.229 is basically identical to the baseline model with 
economic weights.  
 
Finally, we use aggregate measures of national representation in the ECB management (which 
also cover sections after their establishment in 2004). When a country's share in the total 
number of managers is used as weight, the empirical fit of the regression is slightly better than 
in the baseline version of the Taylor rule; the ܴଶ increases to 0.235. For national 
representation shares in the ECB's core business areas, the results turn out to become even 
more remarkable; the ܴଶ	jumps to 0.248, an increase by 8 percent in relative terms compared 
with the specification in column 2. Without taking the precise estimates too literally, the 
                                                 
39 We do not consider national shares at the level of sections, which would reduce the time period with available 
data for the time series model to merely four and a half years. 
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results clearly indicate that national representation in ECB's key units for business operations 
have an effect on the formulation of ECB monetary policy.40 
 
 
 
In extensive sensitivity analyses, we examine the robustness of our results. Specifically, we 
experiment with three perturbations of our underlying empirical model. First, we examine the 
subsample stability of our estimation results. In particular, we rerun the regressions for  
shorter sample periods, starting in 2000:1, 2001:1, 2002:1, and 2003:1 respectively (all 
samples end in 2008:6). Second, we replace the ECB's main refinancing rate as dependent 
variable affects our results, using the 3-months Euribor and the Eonia as alternative measures. 
Finally, we extend our list of weighting schemes to combine national economic data. In 
addition to the (eight) weights reported in Table 6, we examine national representation among 
heads and deputies of the ECB (separately for directorates, divisions and total) as well as 
national representation among heads of core business areas (again separately for directorates 
and divisions). In total, we explore 195 (= 5 periods × 3 policy measures × 13 weighting 
schemes) different regression specifications of the Taylor rule.  
 
< Table 7 here > 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results. Instead of reporting the full set of estimated coefficients, we 
focus on the statistical parameter of interest, the empirical fit of the regressions. Specifically, 
we tabulate the average (minimum, maximum) rank of the ܴଶ of the baseline specification of 
the Taylor rule when national data are combined in proportion to the economic weight of the 
country along with complementary findings for two other selected specifications. As shown in 
the left panel of the table, it seems remarkable that the specification of the Taylor rule for 
economically-weighted data never performs best; its average rank is 7 (out of 13 different 
weighting schemes). Similarly, we replicate our earlier finding that Taylor rules tend to 
display, not surprisingly, a particularly poor empirical fit for weighting schemes based on 
national representation in management areas with a strong egalitarian composition, such as 
                                                 
40 We also perform a more rigorous statistical assessment of the (non-nested) models, using the Davidson and 
McKinnon J-test. This exercise yields generally inconclusive results. Adding the fitted interest rate from the 
Taylor rule for economically-weighted data (column 2) to the specification for representation weights (column 
10) yields a p-value of 0.83; and while the p-value of adding the fitted value from column 10 to column 2 is 
lower (0.60), it is still far away from conventional significance levels. Hence, the test does not allow us to reject 
one model against the other. 
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the Governing Council, the Executive Board, the Governors of national central banks ('equal 
weighting'), and the heads of directorates . On average, a Taylor rule specification for euro 
area aggregates into which national data enter fully symmetrically ranks ninth (out of 13), 
although with a somewhat wider distribution. In contrast, Taylor rules turn out to describe the 
ECB's interest rate setting behavior particularly well for aggregates based on national 
representation among the heads of divisions and the ECB management in general , especially 
if the analysis is additionally restricted on representation in the core business areas. Overall, 
national representation shares in the ECB's core business areas provide the best empirical fit 
of the Taylor rule in almost every specification. The three columns on the extreme right of 
Table 7 report the relative increase in the ܴଶ relative to the baseline Taylor rule with 
economic weights. Depending on the specification, the differences range from 6 to 22 percent 
(in relative terms), indicating that the estimates reported in Table 6 (with a difference of about 
8 percent) are rather at the lower bound. 
 
To further assess the effects of differences in weighting schemes, we examine hypothetical 
interest rate paths. Specifically, we ask: Would monetary policy have been fundamentally 
different if the ECB had followed the Taylor rule with economically-weighted data? For this 
purpose, we replicate the interest rate setting behavior of the ECB using the best-fitting 
Taylor rule (based on the number of heads in the core business areas) and simulate the interest 
rate path when the representation-weighted euro area aggregates are replaced with their size-
weighted values. While the correlation between both weighting schemes is strong, with about 
0.90, the implied differences in monetary policy also depend on the degree of business cycle 
synchronization across countries.41  
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the results of this simulation exercise, comparing actual and predicted 
interest rates (using dynamic forecasting, carrying forward the discrepancy) over the sample 
period. The difference turns out to be of sizable economic importance. If the ECB's monetary 
policy had been appropriately applied on national economic data in proportion to the 
economic size of the euro area member countries, the main refinancing rate would have been 
lower by, on average, about 0.31 percentage points. For subperiods, the deviation of the 
hypothetical interest rate even increases to about 0.61 percentage points. In sum, the results 
                                                 
41 For the extreme case of perfectly correlated business cycles, the weighting of national data would be 
irrelevant. 
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clearly indicate that even moderate differences in weighting schemes can have sizeable 
consequences for the outcome. 
 
Overall, we find that Taylor rules taking into account national presence in the key policy-
making positions of the organization tend to outperform specifications purely based on 
economic weights. National representation in the ECB may well exert a measurable influence 
on the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. As in most 
organizations, hiring decisions are mainly based on a candidate's professional qualifications. 
In addition, however, supranational institutions often aim for broad national representation, 
for various reasons. Potential benefits include greater diversity of personal backgrounds and 
access to local knowledge which may help implement policies (potentially leading to broader 
acceptance). At the same time, however, cultural issues may also become a hindrance to 
organizational success. Possible costs include forgoing talent for geographic variety, network 
effects and a national bias in decision-making. 
 
Looking at the European Central Bank, we show that nationality is indeed relevant for both 
hiring and decision-making. We find a disproportionately narrow spread of national 
representation in the top management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence 
of national networks between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions 
seem to be linked to national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. 
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Table 1. The ECB: A Growing Institution 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Directorates 18 20 20 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 19 
Divisions 34 49 51 52 53 51 52 52 52 52 54 55 
Sections – – – – – 33 32 36 37 41 49 49 
Additional information:             
National Central Banks1 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 15 16 16 
Executive Board 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
ECB Staff2 534 732 941 1,043 1,109 1,217 1,314 1,360 1,3673 1,4783 1,5363 1,5633 
Notes: The table lists the number of managers at different ECB management levels (no deputies). The data refer to the beginning of the year. 
1 Governors of national central banks of euro area member countries who are automatically member of the ECB Governing Council 
2 End of previous year. 3 Full-time equivalent positions 
 
Sources: Own compilations; various issues of the ECB's annual report. 
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Table 2. Who Gets Appointed? Benchmark Results 
 
Heads Directorates Divisions Sections Total Weighted 
Equal share (ܵா) 0.214*** 0.037 -0.043 0.084 0.112** 
 (0.072) (0.055) (0.097) (0.053) (0.053) 
Capital share (ܵ௉) 0.786*** 0.963*** 1.036*** 0.915*** 0.888*** 
 (0.052) (0.068) (0.142) (0.063) (0.054) 
R2 0.528 0.762 0.589 0.761 0.752 
SEE 0.047 0.034 0.048 0.032 0.032 
Obs 248 248 173 248 248 
Heads and deputies     
Equal share (ܵா) 0.195*** 0.037 -0.043 0.087* 0.113** 
 (0.068) (0.050) (0.097) (0.051) (0.051) 
Capital share (ܵ௉) 0.805*** 0.963*** 1.036*** 0.912*** 0.886*** 
 (0.055) (0.060) (0.142) (0.058) (0.051) 
R2 0.561 0.795 0.589 0.779 0.759 
SEE 0.045 0.031 0.048 0.031 0.031 
Obs 248 248 173 248 248 
Heads, core business areas     
Equal share (ܵா) 0.244*** 0.093 0.044 0.147** 0.164*** 
 (0.079) (0.059) (0.124) (0.062) (0.058) 
Capital share (ܵ௉) 0.756*** 0.907*** 0.956*** 0.853*** 0.836*** 
 (0.069) (0.065) (0.176) (0.069) (0.057) 
R2 0.426 0.662 0.443 0.653 0.658 
SEE 0.056 0.041 0.060 0.039 0.038 
Obs 248 248 173 248 248 
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the respective ECB 
management layer (ܴ௜ℓሻ. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3. Who Gets Appointed? Adding Country Controls 
 Directorates Divisions Sections Total Weighted Exec. Board Gov. Council 
Equal share (S E) 0.379*** 0.128*** 0.001 0.178*** 0.225*** 0.530*** 0.878*** 
 (0.049) (0.039) (0.078) (0.037) (0.034) (0.072) (0.027) 
Capital share (S P) 0.621 0.872 0.999 0.822 0.775 0.470 0.122 
 Restr. ߟ௉ ൌ 1 െ ߟா - - - - - - - 
Euro area member 0.019*** -0.004 -0.013 0.000 0.005 0.046*** 0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) 
Length of membership 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Border 0.020*** -0.014*** -0.052*** -0.015*** -0.005 -0.011 -0.007** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Staff NCB 0.079*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.061*** -0.008 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008) 
Education 0.078*** 0.012 0.025 0.028** 0.038*** -0.013 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.012) 
German -0.025** 0.072*** 0.117*** 0.057*** 0.039*** 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.007) 
R2 0.790 0.901 0.811 0.894 0.900 0.821 0.554 
SEE 0.032 0.024 0.035 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.053 
Obs 212 212 152 212 212 212 212 
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the respective ECB management layer (ܴ௜ℓሻ. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Who Gets Appointed? Robustness Checks 
 Confirmed 
nationality only 
Heads  
and deputies 
Core  
business areas  
Core business areas, 
heads and deputies 
Germany dropped 
Equal share (S E) 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.240*** 0.235*** 0.333*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.053) (0.050) (0.033) 
Capital share (S P)  (ߟ௉ ൌ 1 െ ߟா) 0.807 0.808 0.760 0.765 0.667 
Euro area member 0.004 0.005 0.018** 0.022*** 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Length of membership 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.002* 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Distance -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Border -0.017*** -0.009** -0.021*** -0.011* 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Staff NCB 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.055*** 0.025*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) 
Education 0.021* 0.037*** 0.018 0.034** 0.025*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) 
German 0.067*** 0.046*** 0.032** 0.020 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) 
R2 0.902 0.900 0.787 0.803 0.873 
SEE 0.022 0.022 0.032 0.031 0.015 
Obs 212 212 212 212 200 
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the respective ECB management layer (ܴ௜ℓሻ. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Does Presence in Top Management Matter? 
 
 Directorates  Divisions Divisions Sections Sections Sections Sections 
President 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Vice President 0.024 -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.067*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.048** 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) 
Other Member 
Executive Board 
-0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.017** -0.019** -0.013* -0.010* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Directorate   0.084  -0.221**  -0.404*** 
   (0.071)  (0.108)  (0.146) 
Division      0.219 0.531* 
      (0.250) (0.294) 
R2 0.795 0.898 0.900 0.815 0.821 0.834 0.795 
SEE 0.032 0.025 0.025 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.032 
Obs 212 212 212 152 152 152 212 
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the respective ECB management layer (ܴ௜ℓሻ. Other regressors, analogous to 
the specification in Table 3, included, but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 6. Taylor Rule Estimates for the Euro Area Using Alternative Weighting Schemes 
 
Economic weight Representation weight 
 Real GDP Real GDP Real GDP Govern'g 
Council 
Executive 
Board 
NCB 
Governors
Direct's Divisions Total Total,  
core 
Constant 3.623** 3.615** 3.629** 2.390** 2.639** 2.317** 3.573** 3.397** 3.351** 3.129** 
(0.199) (0.195) (0.22) (0.149) (0.198) (0.137) (0.248) (0.155) (0.149) (0.121) 
Inflation gap	ሺߚሻ 1.977** 1.881** 1.933** 1.620** 1.604** 1.589** 1.264 1.949** 1.845** 1.707** 
(0.508) (0.476) (0.586) (0.463) (0.636) (0.435) (0.858) (0.441) (0.447) (0.391) 
Output gap	ሺߛሻ 1.923** 1.891** 1.947** 1.802** 2.405** 1.552** 1.705** 1.414** 1.496** 1.557** 
(0.314) (0.312) (0.371) (0.300) (0.510) (0.256) (0.441) (0.237) (0.252) (0.239) 
Speed of adjustment ሺߩሻ 0.900** 0.897** 0.907** 0.889** 0.921** 0.876** 0.908** 0.883** 0.886** 0.882** 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.025) (0.042) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
AR parameter ሺߜ ሻ -0.111 
(0.056) 
 
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
R2 0.244 0.231 0.211 0.208 0.199 0.201 0.184 0.229 0.235 0.248 
Obs 112 113 112 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Notes: Dependent variable is the (change in the) main refinancing rate. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7. Summary Results of Taylor Rule Estimates for the Euro Area Using Alternative Weighting Schemes and Specifications 
 
 Economic weight   Equal weight   Representation weight (Total, core) 
rk R2 rk of R2 R2 (relative, in %) 
Average Min. Max. Average Min. Max. Average Min. Max. 
Main refinancing rate 7 7 10 9 3 11 13.17 7.36 22.46 
3-month Euribor 7 5 8 9 6 12 10.42 7.28 14.40 
Eonia 7 3 9 5 4 12 11.34 6.27 19.81 
Notes: The table reports the rank of the R2 of the Taylor rule out of 13 specifications. R2 refers to the relative difference of the R2 to the Taylor rule specification 
using economic weights. 
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Figure 1. Main Refinancing Rate and Counterfactual Based on Economic Weights (%) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Main refinancing rate (line); predicted rate (dotted). 
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Appendix: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Dir., Dir. General Country share of ECB directors Own computation 248 0.048 0.068 0 0.250 
Divisions Country share of ECB division heads Own computation 248 0.048 0.069 0 0.346 
Sections Country share of ECB section heads Own computation 173 0.048 0.075 0 0.408 
Total Country share of ECB managers (total number 
of heads of directorate, division and section) 
Own computation 248 0.048 0.065 0 0.350 
Weighted Country share of ECB managers (weighted 
number of heads of directorate [weight of 1], 
division [0.5] and section [0.25]) 
Own computation 248 0.048 0.064 0 0.315 
Executive Board Country share of Executive Board members Own computation 248 0.048 0.076 0 0.167 
Governing Council Country share of Governing Council members Own computation 248 0.048 0.044 0 0.118 
Equal Share 1/Number of EU member countries Own computation 248 0.048 0.014 0.037 0.067 
Capital Share ECB Capital Subscription Share ECB 248 0.048 0.062 0.001 0.245 
Euro Area Member Dummy = 1 if country is member of the euro 
area  
Own computation 248 0.621 0.486 0 1 
Distance Distance of national capital from Frankfurt in 
km (Germany: 150 km) 
Own computation 248 970.5 580.7 150 2596 
Border Dummy = 1 if country has common border with 
Germany 
Own computation 248 0.339 0.474 0 1 
German Dummy = 1 if German is official language Own computation 248 0.097 0.296 0 1 
English Dummy = 1 if English is official language Own computation 248 0.145 0.353 0 1 
Staff NCB Log staff size of national central bank Central Bank Directory 248 2792.7 4001.9 140 16077 
Main Refinancing 
Rate 
Main refinancing rate ECB 114 3.066 0.896 2 4.75 
Inflation Gap Deviation of professional forecast of CPI 
inflation from inflation target of 2% 
Consensus Economics 114 -0.104 0.279 -0.851 0.74 
Output Gap Deviation of professional forecast of GDP 
growth from potential growth of 2.25% 
Consensus Economics 114 -0.15 0.534 -0.984 1.086 
Education Share of population with upper and tertiary 
education 
Eurostat 248 0.655 0.147 0.211 0.856 
German speaking Share of population speaking German (self-
reported language knowledge) 
Eurostat 248 0.268 0.292 0.024 99.4 
 
